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Introduction	
Labour’s	defeat	in	the	2015	British	General	Election	can	be	explained	by	a	great	many	factors,	as	the	
official	post-mortem	(the	‘Beckett	report’)	makes	clear.	However,	when	the	Beckett	report	was	
published,	the	headlines	in	the	left-wing	newspapers	consistently	settled	on	the	party’s	lack	of	trust	
by	the	public	on	‘welfare’	as	a	key	explanation	for	their	dismal	election	result	(alongside	parallel	
concerns	about	the	economy	and	immigration).1		This	reflects	a	much	wider	preoccupation	on	the	
British	left	in	recent	years	(not	just	within	the	Labour	Party)	about	how	to	respond	to	public	
attitudes	towards	the	benefits	system,	which	are	generally	perceived	to	be	both	harsh	and	based	on	
‘myths’	fuelled	by	politicians	and	the	media,	leaving	the	public	fundamentally	at	odds	with	left-wing	
values	(e.g.	Hills,	2014;	Horton	&	Gregory,	2009;	Taylor-Gooby,	2015).	This	potentially	leaves	
progressives	with	a	choice	of	either	trying	to	correct	the	public’s	myths,	or	simply	accommodating	
their	policy	agenda	to	a	view	of	the	world	that	they	do	not	share.	
In	this	paper,	however,	I	want	to	argue	that	some	of	these	concerns	are	misplaced,	bringing	together	
several	different	pieces	of	empirical	evidence	that	have	not	previously	been	integrated.	To	be	
absolutely	clear:	the	British	public	do	believe	myths,	and	they	are	also	more	negative	about	benefit	
claimants	than	they	used	to	be,	as	I	will	show.	Yet	this	does	not	mean	that	‘mythbusting’	is	the	best	
way	of	getting	public	support	for	progressive	benefit	reforms.	While	myths	are	associated	with	
negative	perceptions	of	claimants,	evidence	suggest	mythbusting	is	unlikely	to	change	this.	
Moreover,	such	attitudes	are	not	what	primarily	sets	us	apart	from	times	and	places	where	there	is	
more	public	support	for	the	benefits	system.	Instead,	what	is	crucial	is	how	far	the	public	focus	on	
the	positive	consequences	of	the	benefits	system,	and	how	much	we	focus	on	the	(widely-perceived)	
positive	vs.	negative	consequences	in	our	public	debates.		
Myths	and	deservingness	judgements	in	21st-century	Britain	
There	are	two	parts	to	the	prevailing	view	of	British	benefit	attitudes.	Firstly,	the	idea	that	public	
attitudes	have	become	more	hostile	is,	as	Hudson	and	Lunt	(in	press)	put	it,	“now	close	to	an	
orthodox	view.”		This	is	hardly	surprising	in	the	face	of	newspaper	headlines	that	have	regularly	
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proclaimed	that	attitudes	towards	benefit	claimants	are	‘hardening’,	often	based	on	the	latest	
launch	of	the	British	Social	Attitudes	(BSA)	survey.2		And	this	consensus	is	not	completely	divorced	
from	the	empirical	reality:	attitudes	towards	unemployment	benefit	claimants	have	definitely	
hardened,	and	noticeably	fewer	people	believe	that	the	government	should	spend	more	on	‘welfare	
benefits	for	the	poor’	(Clery,	2012;	Taylor	&	Taylor-Gooby,	2015),	as	illustrated	in	Figure	1	below.			
Yet	the	existence	of	this	decline	can	blind	us	to	the	nuances	of	shifts	in	public	opinion.	Comparing	
current	views	to	the	late	1980s,	the	numbers	saying	that	‘most	people	on	the	dole	are	fiddling	in	one	
way	or	another’	or	that	‘many	people	who	get	social	security	don’t	really	deserve	any	help’	has	
barely	risen	(Taylor	&	Taylor-Gooby,	2015),	as	also	shown	in	Figure	1.	Moreover,	it	is	still	the	case	–	
despite	the	financial	crisis,	and	despite	hardening	attitudes	to	unemployed	people	–	that	more	
people	agree	than	disagree	that	the	Government	should	raise	‘welfare	benefits	for	the	poor,	even	if	
it	means	higher	taxes’	(see	Baumberg,	2014	and	below).	There	is	some	truth	to	the	idea	that	
attitudes	to	the	benefits	system	have	hardened,	but	the	scale	and	uniformity	of	these	shifts	is	
perceived	to	be	greater	than	the	evidence	bears	out.	
[Figure	1	about	here]	
The	second	part	of	the	prevailing	view	is	that	the	public	do	not	have	an	accurate	view	of	the	benefits	
system,	instead	believing	‘myths’	(often	argued	to	be	spread	by	parts	of	the	press;	see	Baumberg	et	
al.,	2012).	This	is	not	just	a	view	of	think-tanks	and	campaigning	organisations,	but	is	also	shared	by	
notable	academics	such	as	John	Hills	(2014)	and	Peter	Taylor-Gooby	(2015).		It	is	also	supported	by	
the	empirical	evidence,	if	anything	even	more	strongly	than	increasing	hostility	towards	benefit	
claimants.	In	a	separate	paper	I	systematically	reviewed	46	beliefs	across	18	datasets,	and	compared	
these	to	the	best	available	data	on	the	true	picture	(Baumberg	Geiger,	submitted).	My	overall	
conclusion	was	that	the	British	public	do	indeed	have	low	levels	of	understanding	of	the	benefits	
system,	primarily	in	ways	that	would	seem	to	imply	that	claimants	are	undeserving:		
• People	wildly	overestimate	how	much	is	spent	on	unemployment	benefits	compared	to	
pensions.	They	also	overestimate	other	related	aspects	of	unemployment	benefits	(how	
much	claimants	without	children	receive,	and	the	proportion	of	the	population	that	is	
unemployed).		
• Half	the	population	believe	out-of-work	benefit	claims	have	risen	in	the	past	fifteen	years,	
when	they	have	actually	fallen	noticeably.	
• It	is	difficult	to	know	the	true	level	of	benefit	fraud	–	but	the	Government’s		extensive	
attempts	to	estimate	the	level	of	probable	fraud	suggest	low	levels,	and	even	assuming	this	
is	a	lower	bound,	the	public	overestimate	fraud	compared	to	any	reasonable	figure.	
• On	almost	no	measure	do	more	than	one-third	of	individuals	give	a	correct	answer	(as	I	
define	it,	allowing	some	room	for	uncertainty	/	rounding	in	people’s	numeric	responses).		
Inevitably	there	are	further	important	nuances	here.	The	public	are	in	fact	relatively	accurate	on	
average	when	estimating	the	share	of	the	working-age	population	who	currently	claim	out-of-work	
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benefits	(and	within	this,	nearly	one	in	four	people	provide	underestimates	rather	than	
overestimates).	People	also	tend	to	underestimate	how	much	certain	sorts	of	claimants	receive,	
believing	the	system	is	less	generous	to	pensioners	and	unemployed	people	with	children	than	it	
really	is.	And	it	is	important	to	avoid	a	false	air	of	absolute	certainty	around	these	myths;	the	true	
figures	are	often	uncertain,	and	people’s	beliefs	are	obtained	from	sample	surveys	(often	web	
panels)	in	which	response	biases	are	likely.	Still,	these	nuances	do	not	change	the	overall	picture,	in	
which	the	evidence	strongly	supports	the	assumption	of	widespread	myths.	
The	role	of	mythbusting	
While	there	do	seem	to	be	widespread	benefit	myths,	my	critique	here	is	the	implication	that	
‘mythbusting’	is	the	best	way	of	getting	public	support	for	progressive	benefit	reforms.	It	is	
important	not	to	construct	a	straw	man	here;	Hills	(2014)	and	Peter	Taylor-Gooby	(2015)	are	not	
naively	arguing	that	mythbusting	is	the	panacea	for	all	public	concerns.	Yet	the	need	to	tackle	
misperceptions	is	a	common	theme	in	progressive	debate,	and	sometimes	is	central:	for	example,	an	
article	in	the	Guardian	newspaper	argues	that	“it	is	perhaps	this	ignorance	[of	the	welfare	state]	
which	is	putting	the	survival	of	a	safe	system	of	support	for	the	population	at	especial	risk”	
(Beresford,	2013),	while	the	Independent	newspaper	contained	a	headline,	“Voters	‘brainwashed	by	
Tory	welfare	myths’,	says	new	poll”	(Grice,	2013).	More	broadly,	‘mythbusters’	are	commonly	used	
as	an	element	in	campaigning	(among	many	others,	see	Baptist	Union	of	Great	Britain	et	al.,	2013;	
Coote	&	Lyall,	2013).	
However,	mythbusters	suffer	two	sets	of	problems	in	changing	public	attitudes:	they	may	not	
change	people’s	beliefs,	and	even	if	they	do,	these	changes	in	beliefs	may	not	result	in	changes	in	
attitudes.	I	review	the	evidence	for	each	of	these	in	turn.	
The	impact	of	mythbusting	on	factual	beliefs		
We	might	expect	that	presenting	people	with	the	facts	will	make	their	beliefs	more	accurate	–	but	
sadly	persuasion	is	rarely	that	simple.	Partly	this	is	a	matter	of	memory:	the	familiarity	of	
misperceptions	may	linger	even	after	the	detail	of	their	inaccuracy	fades	(Peter	&	Koch,	2015).	
Moreover,	repeated	misperceptions	increase	the	fluency	with	which	we	can	access	the	underlying	
idea,	which	makes	the	idea	seem	more	credible,	pithily	summarised	by	Lakoff	(2014)	as	‘don’t	think	
of	an	elephant!’	As	a	result,	“it	is	extremely	difficult	to	return	the	beliefs	of	people	who	have	been	
exposed	to	misinformation	to	a	baseline	similar	to	those	of	people	who	were	never	exposed	to	it”	
(Lewandowsky	et	al.,	2012).	It	is	also	a	matter	of	‘reactance’,	an	instinctive	bristling	when	being	told	
what	to	think	(Lewandowsky	et	al.,	2012).	For	these	reasons,	it	is	even	possible	that	mythbusting	will	
make	our	beliefs	even	less	accurate.	
But	beyond	this,	there	is	also	a	crucial	challenge	around	credibility.	Sometimes	a	myth	will	appear	to	
be	more	credible	than	the	truth,	particularly	where	the	‘mythbuster’	comes	from	an	untrusted	
source.		Hence	for	some	right-wing	individuals	with	hostile	attitudes	to	benefit	claimants,	
mythbusters	by	campaigning	organisations	that	they	usually	distrust	are	unlikely	to	be	convincing.	
These	issues	are	magnified	when	the	myths	are	part	of	a	compelling	story	or	‘frame’	that	fits	with	
people’s	wider	mental	models,	whereas	the	facts	are	disembodied	and	would	leave	gaps	in	people’s	
understanding	of	the	world.	As	the	influential	George	Lakoff	puts	it	(2006),	“facts	can	be	assimilated	
into	the	brain	only	if	there	is	a	frame	to	make	sense	out	of	them…	The	consequence	is	that	arguing	
simply	in	terms	of	facts…	will	likely	fall	on	deaf	ears”.			
Theory	therefore	suggests	that	mythbusting	may	either	work	or	backfire	–	and	there	is	now	a	
burgeoning	literature	that	seeks	to	test	which	way	this	falls	empirically.	Much	of	this	stems	from	
Nyhan	&	Reifler	(2010),	who	show	that	mythbusting	can	fail	or	even	backfire	across	several	policy	
issues	(Iraq,	stem	cell	research,	and	tax	cuts).	However,	an	alternative	interpretation	of	the	Nyhan	&	
Reifler	study	is	that	its	attempts	to	improve	knowledge	are	simply	weak	and	unconvincing.		Other	
research	in	the	same	vein	has	been	more	mixed,	with	some	showing	similar	results	(Peter	&	Koch,	
2015)	but	others	finding	that	mythbusting	can	be	effective.	For	example,	studies	have	shown	that	
fact-checks	sway	people's	interpretation	of	campaign	adverts	(Fridkin	et	al.,	2015),	and	that	
newspaper	articles	that	correct	misperceptions	can	change	beliefs	even	in	the	midst	of	induced	
emotions	and	partisan	biases	(Weeks,	2015).	
When	it	comes	to	benefits	beliefs	themselves,	the	only	relevant	experimental	study	is	a	recent	
working	paper	by	Barnes	et	al	(2016).	They	build	their	experiment	around	the	UK	Government’s	
decision	to	send	all	taxpayers	a	‘taxpayer	receipt’	showing	what	their	money	was	spent	on.	(It	should	
be	noted	that	the	statements	themselves	have	been	heavily	criticised	for	being	misleading.3)	Barnes	
et	al	find	that	people’s	knowledge	of	public	spending	in	general	improves	after	receiving	the	
information,	and	that	people	who	were	encouraged	to	check	the	receipt	had	better	knowledge	than	
people	who	did	not,	although	they	do	not	show	whether	this	applies	more	or	less	to	perceived	social	
security	spending	vs.	other	spending.		
Other	studies	using	different	designs	on	different	beliefs,	however,	have	suggested	that	benefits	
mythbusting	is	likely	to	fail.	Repeated	qualitative	studies	in	the	UK	have	presented	people	with	
factual	information,	and	found	that	it	is	simply	not	believed	by	participants.	Not	all	facts	are	rejected	
out-of-hand;	a	growth	in	housing	benefit	claims	among	working	people	has	some	resonance,	for	
example	(Doron	&	Tinker,	2013).	But	mythbusters	that	contradict	people’s	existing	beliefs	are	widely	
rejected,	particularly	when	they	are	based	on	statistics	produced	by	distrusted	institutions	(Doron	&	
Tinker,	2013;	Mattinson,	2014:51).	For	example,	one	study	reported	that	“in	cases	where	the	
evidence	appeared	to	contradict	their	original	views,	participants	typically	dismissed	the	evidence	as	
‘government	propaganda’	or	‘newspaper	talk’”	(Knight,	2015).		Similarly,	an	Ipsos	MORI/Demos	
study	quoted	one	respondent	saying,	“How	do	they	get	these	figures	then?	Is	it	because	they	don’t	
want	people	to	know	that	their	system	is	rubbish	and	that	they’re	being	conned?	Because	we’re	
being	conned	all	over	the	place	with	immigration,	the	whole	lot,	so	I	don’t	think	I’d	trust	the	figures”	
(Duffy	et	al.,	2013).	
The	impact	of	mythbusting	on	attitudes	
A	further	assumption	in	benefits	mythbusting	is	that	there	is	a	causal	link	between	people’s	beliefs	
about	the	benefits	system	and	their	deservingness	judgements.	This	is	plausible	in	the	light	of	the	
empirical	literature,	but	with	caveats.	In	a	separate	analysis	(Baumberg	Geiger,	In	Press),	I	show	that	
beliefs	about	the	benefits	system	are	often	strongly	associated	with	deservingness	judgements,	even	
after	controlling	for	political	preferences	and	sociodemographic	factors	(education,	working	status,	
region,	age	and	gender).	One	way	of	expressing	this	relationship	is	via	a	method	that	Sturgis	(2003)	
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terms	‘simulation’,	which	estimates	what	the	population’s	attitudes	would	be	if	their	knowledge	was	
uniformly	correct.	A	selection	of	the	simulation	results	from	Baumberg	Geiger	(In	Press)	are	shown	
below	in	Table	1.	
[Table	1	about	here]		
For	example,	this	shows	that	if	people	knew	the	correct	proportion	of	welfare	spending	that	was	
fraudulent	–	taking	‘correct’	to	be	10%	of	claims	to	allow	for	hidden	fraud	and	a	margin	of	error,	but	
noting	that	this	is	considerably	higher	than	the	government’s	extensive	fraud-checking	suggests	–	
then	8.1%	fewer	people	would	agree	that	there	is	a	‘dependency	culture’.		Overall,	the	models	
suggest	that	for	most	beliefs,	if	people’s	knowledge	was	correct	then	5-10%	fewer	would	agree	that	
claimants	are	undeserving.	These	add	up	to	a	considerable	effect	for	the	four	beliefs	that	are	in	the	
same	survey	–	73.8%	believed	that	there	was	a	dependency	culture	if	they	were	wrong	on	all	four	
beliefs,	compared	to	only	35.9%	for	those	with	3	or	4	correct	answers.	However,	beliefs	about	the	
level	of	benefits	that	claimants	receive,	or	their	incentive	to	work,	have	no	relationship	with	
deservingness	judgements,	presumably	depending	on	their	connections	to	the	particular	belief	
structure	held	by	the	individual	(see	further	discussion	in	Baumberg	Geiger,	In	Press).	
Yet	while	people	with	certain	beliefs	hold	certain	attitudes,	this	may	indicate	that	their	attitudes	
determine	their	beliefs	rather	than	vice	versa.	People	tend	to	selectively	expose	themselves	to	
information	(Hart	et	al.,	2009)	–	and	to	interpret	the	information	they	do	receive	(Taber	et	al.,	2009)	
–	in	ways	that	support	their	existing	attitudes,	a	much-researched	phenomenon	known	as	
‘motivated	reasoning’.		Not	only	does	this	make	it	difficult	to	convince	someone	to	change	strongly	
held	beliefs	(as	above),	but	if	a	certain	belief	changes,	then	people	may	rearrange	the	structure	of	
their	worldview	to	continue	justify	their	attitudes,	rather	than	changing	the	attitude	itself.		
Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	the	experimental	evidence	on	the	impact	of	information	on	attitudes	is	
mixed.	Kuziemko	et	al	(2015)	found	that	giving	people	inequality-related	information	made	them	
much	more	likely	to	agree	that	inequality	was	a	serious	problem	and	support	a	higher	estate	tax	(but	
had	no	impact	on	support	for	other	policy	proposals	such	as	a	higher	millionaire	tax).	In	contrast,	
Lawrence	&	Sides	(2014)	found	no	impacts	on	policy	attitudes	of	giving	people	a	varied	list	of	policy-
relevant	statistics.	Overall,	Lawrence	&	Sides	(2014)’s	conclusion	seems	reasonable:	“providing	
knowledge	can,	but	does	not	necessarily,	change	people’s	minds	about	political	issues.”		(It	is	also	
worth	noting	that	these	survey	experiments	are	a	slightly	artificial	design	that	is	likely	to	
overestimate	the	real-life,	longer-term	impacts	of	mythbusting	(Barabas	&	Jerit,	2010)).	
When	it	comes	to	benefits	beliefs,	the	evidence	is	sparse	but	more	pessimistic.	One	study	found	that	
several	pieces	of	information	had	no	impact	on	people’s	support	for	benefits-related	policies	
(Kuklinski	et	al.,	2000).	The	UK	experiment	on	‘tax	receipts’	by	Barnes	et	al	did	find	that	knowledge	
improved	(see	above),	but	without	any	change	in	attitudes.	One	interpretation	is	that	mythbusters	
and	other	sources	of	information	can	give	people	‘facts’	that	they	then	later	repeat	to	survey	
interviewers,	which	is	a	far	cry	from	fundamental	transformations	in	people’s	ways	of	thinking	that	
would	lead	them	to	support	different	policies.		This	would	also	explain	why	other	types	of	
mythbusting	have	been	found	to	influence	beliefs	but	have	no	effect	(or	even	contrary	effects)	on	
attitudes	(Nyhan	&	Reifler,	2015).		
A	blueprint	for	successful	mythbusting	
This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	all	mythbusting	is	doomed	to	failure	–	but	it	does	provide	
several	lessons.	Firstly,	disembodied	facts	do	not	help	people	come	to	a	more	accurate	worldview,	
and	it	is	instead	better	to	provide	mythbusting	embedded	within	alternative	stories	that	‘fill	the	
coherence	gap’	(Lewandowsky	et	al.,	2012).	This	is	also	the	conclusion	of	those	who	have	
experimented	with	mythbusting	in	Britain,	who	argue	“the	successful	‘scrounger’	narrative	is	rooted	
in	anecdote,	stories	and	symbols,	not	statistics.”	(Mattinson,	2014),	or	more	succinctly,	“foster	
conversations,	don’t	just	dispense	facts"	(Doron	&	Tinker,	2013).	Some	commentators	are	coming	to	
similar	conclusions	that	“fact-busting	has	its	limits”	(Moore,	2013)	or	that	we	should	stop	
“bombarding	the	electorate	with	statistics	that	don’t	resonate”	(Jones,	2016).	
Secondly,	mythbusting	needs	to	be	credible	for	the	people	it	is	trying	to	influence.	One	charity	
described	their	wider	attempt	at	publishing	a	mythbusting	supplement	in	the	New	Statesman	
magazine,	which	“was	well	received	–	but	only	by	people	who	were	already	well	informed.	There	is	
no	evidence	to	date	to	suggest	that	we	have	changed	anyone’s	mind”	(Knight,	2015).	Rather	than	
appealing	to	the	converted,	successful	mythbusting	“must	be	tailored”	to	the	people	who	need	to	be	
convinced,	“preferably	by	ensuring	that	the	correction	is	consonant	with	the	audience’s	worldview”	
(Lewandowsky	et	al.,	2012:120).	Indeed,	there	is	some	–	albeit	suggestive	rather	than	definitive	–	
evidence	that	‘partisan	politicians	who	speak	against	their	own	apparent	political	interests’	may	be	
the	most	effective	voices	of	mythbusting	(Berinsky,	2015).	
Finally,	mythbusting	may	do	more	than	simply	directly	change	people’s	minds.	Nyhan	&	Reifler	
(2014)	test	if	drawing	state	legislators’	attention	to	the	Pullitzer-winning	‘Politifact’	operation	leads	
them	to	make	fewer	claims	that	are	later	fact-checked	and	found	to	be	untrue.	While	the	numbers	
of	claims	that	are	fact-checked	by	Politifact	is	relatively	small	over	this	period	and	the	analyses	
therefore	low-powered,	there	is	some	suggestive	evidence	that	there	is	an	effect.	Mythbusting	may	
therefore	contribute	to	a	more	truthful	public	debate,	and	have	an	indirect	impact	on	public	
attitudes	via	the	behaviour	of	elected	representatives	and	other	prominent	public	figures.	Still,	while	
well-constructed	benefits	mythbusting	may	have	some	value,	it	seems	a	distant	hope	that	it	will	
have	a	transformative	effect	on	the	public’s	knowledge	and	attitudes	on	benefits.	
Myths	and	deservingness	judgements	in	other	times	and	places	
If	mythbusting	is	likely	to	fail,	then	British	progressives	may	resign	themselves	to	the	impossibility	of	
progressive	reforms	in	the	midst	of	a	hostile	public	debate.	Yet	this	too	relies	on	a	faulty	assumption	
about	the	difference	between	contemporary	Britain	and	other	times	and	places	in	which	the	
benefits	system	is	more	generous,	as	this	section	explains.		
While	the	evidence	on	benefit	beliefs	in	other	times	and	places	is	thin,	the	limited	evidence	that	
exists	suggests	that	the	public	are	never	particularly	well-informed	about	the	benefits	system.	In	
Britain,	Golding	&	Middleton	(1982:174)	found	that	an	outright	majority	overestimated	a	
hypothetical	family’s	income	on	Supplementary	Benefit	in	1977,	though	perceptions	of	the	level	of	
unemployment	seemed	to	be	reasonably	accurate.	Hudson	&	Lunt’s	review	of	even	earlier	survey	
data	(this	volume)	finds	that	understanding	of	the	famous	Beveridge	Report	in	1942	was	limited.	
There	is	no	comparative	data	on	benefits	beliefs	across	countries,	but	Scandinavians	similarly	have	
imperfect	knowledge	of	their	unemployment	and	long-term	sickness	rates,	with	only	around	half	of	
respondents	managing	to	provide	a	roughly	correct	answer	(see	Appendices	to	Baumberg	Geiger,	In	
Press).	
As	a	further	step,	we	can	compare	perceptions	of	the	value	of	benefits	in	Belgium	vs.	the	UK,	based	
on	two	sets	of	similar	questions	in	the	2014	Belgian	National	Election	Study	(BNES;	Swyngedouw,	
Abts	&	Meuleman,	2015)4	and	the	UK	studies	reviewed	in	Baumberg	Geiger	(submitted):	5	
- Approach	1:	these	surveys	firstly	ask	if	a	single	benefit	claimant	has	enough	to	live	on	(UK)	or	
whether	their	benefits	are	too	high/low	(Belgium).	Respondents	are	then	asked	this	again	
after	hearing	the	actual	amount	of	the	benefit;	if	people	become	more	generous	then	this	
implies	that	they	overestimated	the	real	benefit	level.	In	Britain,	24%	overestimate	the	
benefit	and	13%	underestimate	it	(52%	not	changing	their	view	when	given	the	true	figure),	
whereas	in	Belgium,	33%	overestimate	the	benefit	and	12%	underestimate	it.		
- Approach	2:	the	surveys	also	ask	directly	for	the	estimated	value	of	benefits	received	by	a	
couple	(UK)	or	a	single	person	(Belgium).	Taking	correct	responses	to	be	those	within	a	
window	of	£25/pw	(UK)	or	€100/pcm	(Belgium)	around	the	true	value,	29%	give	
underestimates	and	50%	overestimates	in	the	UK,	whereas	in	Belgium	26%	give	
overestimates	and	45%	overestimates.	
While	there	are	some	further	differences	between	the	surveys	that	make	exact	comparisons	
difficult,6	benefit	beliefs	seem	to	be	about	as	inaccurate	in	both	countries	–	something	which	is	
further	supported	by	the	similar	inaccuracy	of	Belgians	and	Britons	in	estimating	levels	of	
unemployment	and	long-term	sickness	(see	Appendices	to	Baumberg	Geiger,	In	Press).	Accurate	
																																								 																				
4	This	post-electoral	study	was	carried	out	among	a	register-based	probability	sample	of	Belgians	entitled	to	
vote	in	the	2014	elections.	The	study	consists	of	two	different	surveys	First,	respondents	where	interviewed	by	
means	of	a	computer-assisted	personal	interview	(CAPI;	response	rate	47%).	Subsequently,	respondents	were	
asked	 to	 fill	 out	 a	 20-pages	 drop-off	 questionnaire	 and	 to	 return	 it	 via	 mail	 (which	 74%	 of	 the	 initial	
respondents	did,	 leading	 to	a	 sample	 size	of	1403).	 The	exact	wordings	of	 the	questions	 in	 the	BNES	are	as	
follows:	
Question	1:	“People	who	do	not	have	sufficient	means	of	subsistence	in	Belgium	can	obtain	social	
assistance	from	the	OCMW.	Do	you	think	that	amount	is	too	high	or	too	low?”	Answer	categories:	1	
(Much	too	high)	–	5	(Much	too	low)	
Question	2:	“People	who	do	not	have	sufficient	means	of	subsistence	in	Belgium	can	obtain	social	
assistance	from	the	OCMW.	There	are	few	people	who	know	exactly	how	much	the	social	assistance	
benefit	is.	Expressed	in	euros,	how	high	do	you	estimate	the	social	assistance	benefit	is	for	someone	
who	lives	alone?	You	can	always	guess	when	you	do	not	know	the	correct	amount.”	
Question	3:	“People	who	do	not	have	sufficient	means	of	subsistence	in	Belgium	can	obtain	social	
assistance	from	the	OCMW.	In	the	case	of	a	single	person,	the	social	assistance	benefit	is	currently	817	
Euro	per	month.	Do	you	think	that	amount	is	too	high	or	too	low?”	Answer	categories:	1	(Much	too	
high)	–	5	(Much	too	low)	
In	order	to	avoid	memory	effects,	questions	1	and	2	were	included	in	the	first	survey,	and	question	3	in	the	
second	survey.	
5	The	UK	questions	are	given	in	Baumberg	Geiger	(submitted),	Table	3	(for	approach	1)	and	Table	1	(for	
approach	2).		
6	The	main	differences	are:	(i)	the	Belgian	questions	refer	to	a	benefit	including	housing	costs	(as	there	is	no	
separate	housing	benefit),	whereas	the	UK	questions	explicitly	exclude	housing	costs;	(ii)	for	approach	1,	the	
Belgian	questions	are	asked	in	two	separate	surveys	(the	follow-up	question	being	asked	in	a	self-completion	
survey	after	the	interview),	whereas	the	British	questions	are	asked	directly	following	one	another;	and	(iii)	the	
claimant	types	are	different	between	countries	for	approach	2.	
benefits	beliefs	are	clearly	not	a	precondition	of	the	more	positive	benefits	attitudes	in	Belgium	(see	
Figure	2).		
Moreover,	even	at	the	moments	in	history	where	the	benefits	system	was	being	expanded,	hostile	
attitudes	to	some	groups	of	claimants	existed.	For	example,	in	the	midst	of	the	US	New	Deal,	there	
was	“far	more	skepticism	and	outright	hostility	towards	the	safety	net	than	our	admiring	view	of	the	
policy	history	would	suggest”	(Newman	&	Jacobs,	2008).	Hudson	&	Lunt	(this	volume)	likewise	find	
such	attitudes	in	the	postwar	consensus	of	1960s	Britain;	for	example,	they	show	that	large	
majorities	agreed	that	‘many	people	are	drawing	supplementary	benefit/national	assistance	who	
could	really	be	earning	enough	to	support	themselves	if	they	wanted	to’.	The	same	is	true	in	the	
relatively	generous	systems	of	present-day	Scandinavia.	For	example,	68-73%	of	people	in	
Scandinavian	countries	say	that	people	often	look	down	on	social	assistance	claimants	(Albrekt	
Larsen,	2006:Table	6.2),	while	29-43%	of	Scandinavians	agree	that	social	benefits/services	make	
people	lazy,	and	32-51%	agree	that	many	people	manage	to	obtain	benefits/services	that	they	are	
not	entitled	to.7		
In	fact,	if	we	look	across	European	countries,	the	perception	of	negative	economic	and	moral	
consequences	is	higher	in	those	countries	that	have	higher	social	expenditures	(van	Oorschot	et	al.,	
2012:192).	The	perception	of	negative	consequences	across	each	country	in	the	ESS	is	shown	below	
in	Figure	2,	and	highlights	that	the	Scandinavian	countries	are	unexceptional	in	their	perception	of	
negative	consequences;	it	is	clearly	not	the	case	such	attitudes	present	an	insurmountable	barrier	to	
more	generous	welfare	states.		What	van	Oorschot	et	al	make	clear,	however,	is	that	the	perception	
of	positive	consequences	of	the	welfare	state	–	preventing	widespread	poverty,	creating	a	more	
equal	society,	and	helping	people	combine	work	and	family	–	is	higher	still	in	these	countries.	As	
they	put	it,	“a	higher	spending	welfare	state	promotes	its	social	legitimacy	by	stimulating	in	people	
the	idea	that	it	is	doing	a	good	job,	more	than	that	it	arouses	their	worries	about	its	effect	on	the	
economy	and	morals.”		
[Figure	2	about	here]	
Again,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	on	my	argument	here.	I	am	not	claiming	that	negative	attitudes	
towards	benefits	are	equally	high	in	Scandinavian	countries	as	the	UK,	as	Figure	2	makes	clear	
(indeed,	the	same	ESS	data	shows	that	far	more	Britons	think	that	social	benefits/services	make	
people	lazy).	Nor	am	I	claiming	that	Scandinavian	perceptions	of	their	benefits	system	are	as	
erroneous	as	British	perceptions	(Britons	perceive	higher	levels	of	unemployment	and	long-term	
sickness	compared	to	Swedes,	for	example,	despite	Sweden	having	higher	levels	of	both;	Baumberg	
Geiger,	In	Press).	Instead,	I	want	to	argue	that	myths	and	perceptions	of	undeservingness	are	not	
unique	to	the	UK,	and	can	be	found	even	in	times	and	places	in	which	the	benefits	system	is	much	
more	generous.	What	is	different	in	such	settings	is	not	whether	such	ideas	exist	to	any	great	extent	
in	society,	but	how	widespread	they	are,	and	how	far	they	are	balanced	by	widespread	perceptions	
of	more	positive	consequences	of	the	welfare	state.		
																																								 																				
7	Authors	own	analysis	of	weighted	ESS	data	2008.	
The	ambivalence	of	benefits	attitudes		
What	characterises	attitudes	to	the	benefits	system,	above	all,	is	ambivalence.	This	seems	to	be	true	
of	all	countries	at	all	times	–	even	when	the	benefits	system	is	generous	and	popular,	many	people	
still	have	some	concerns,	as	the	previous	section	has	shown.	The	same	is	true	in	reverse	for	21st	
century	Britain:	even	though	attitudes	are	usually	felt	to	be	predominantly	hostile,	many	people	
have	positive	elements	to	their	attitudes	to	the	benefits	system.	For	example,	when	last	asked	(in	
2003),	over	half	of	people	said	that	they	were	proud	of	Britain’s	social	security	system	(and	not	just	
proud	about	the	welfare	state	in	general).	Nearly	80%	of	respondents	agree	that	large	numbers	who	
are	eligible	for	benefits	fail	to	claim	them	(both	from	BSA	data	in	Baumberg	et	al.,	2012:17).	And	
there	is	relatively	widespread	agreement	in	the	ESS	data	in	the	previous	section	that	the	benefits	
system	has	positive	consequences	in	preventing	widespread	poverty	(57%)	and	helping	people	
combine	work	and	family	(58%).	
Another	way	of	expressing	this	ambivalence	is	to	look	within	a	single	country	at	how	far	groups	
perceived	to	be	deserving	are	supported	compared	to	groups	perceived	to	be	undeserving.	In	the	UK	
in	2013,	far	more	people	thought	there	should	be	less	spending	on	unemployment	benefits	than	
though	that	spending	should	rise	(49%	less	vs.	15%	more).	Yet	the	same	respondents	also	
overwhelmingly	thought	there	should	be	more	spending	on	disabled	people	who	cannot	work	(4%	
less,	54%	more)	(Baumberg,	2014:9).	This	has	visible	impacts	on	political	debate,	most	recently	with	
the	(right-wing)	Government’s	attempt	to	cut	a	(non-work-related)	disability	benefit	by	tightening	
the	eligibility	criteria.	This	faced	overwhelming	public	disagreement	(two	polls	at	the	time	put	
opposition	to	the	policy	at	70%	and	84%)8	and	seems	to	have	been	scrapped	in	the	light	of	a	
backbench	rebellion	and	the	(partially-attributable)	resignation	of	the	Secretary	of	State	(against	
what	he	argued	to	be	a	policy	imposed	by	the	Treasury).9	
Such	differentiation	according	to	deservingness	judgements	is	by	no	means	limited	to	the	UK;	
indeed,	Wim	van	Oorschot	has	influentially	argued	that	there	is	a	universal	ranking	of	different	
claimant	groups	from	most	deserving	to	least	deserving	(van	Oorschot,	2006).	Aarøe	&	Petersen	
(2014)	have	likewise	argued	that	both	Americans	and	Danes	show	a	similar	‘deservingness	heuristic’,	
with	citizens	of	both	countries	making	similar	judgements	about	whether	hypothetical	claimants	are	
worthy	of	support	when	given	a	clear	sign	about	their	motivation	to	work.	It	is	only	when	people	are	
asked	to	form	an	opinion	about	benefits	claimants	in	the	absence	of	clear	deservingness	clues	that	
the	expected	US-Denmark	differences	are	visible.	
The	challenge	in	the	UK	is	therefore	not	that	negative	attitudes	exist,	nor	that	there	is	little	support	
for	claimants	who	are	seen	to	be	undeserving,	nor	even	that	there	is	ambivalence	about	the	benefits	
system	–	for	all	of	these	are	universal.	Rather,	the	challenge	is	that	public	debate	about	benefits	
emphasises	the	negative	side	of	this	ambivalence	at	the	expense	of	the	positive	side,	and	
emphasises	undeserving	claimants	over	deserving	ones.	Hence	in	Figure	2,	the	balance	of	positive	vs.	
negative	perceived	consequences	of	the	welfare	state	is	higher	in	the	Scandinavian	countries	than	
																																								 																				
8	See	the	YouGov	poll	16-17	March	at	https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/03/18/least-fair-budget-
omnishambles/	and	the	Ipsos	MORI	poll	19-22/3/2016	at	https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3713/George-Osbornes-satisfaction-ratings-equal-his-worst-
ever-following-budget.aspx#gallery[m]/2/		
9	See	http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35848687		
nearly	every	other	European	country,	while	the	UK	in	contrast	has	the	most	negative	perceived	
balance	of	any	country	barring	Slovakia	and	Hungary	(van	Oorschot	et	al.,	2012:188).	This	is	reflected	
in	media	coverage:	stories	about	benefits	in	Britain	are	split	between	the	positive	and	negative,	
while	stories	in	the	Scandinavian	press	are	usually	positive	(Larsen	&	Dejgaard,	2013).	
Conclusion		
In	this	article,	I	have	argued	that	some	of	the	concerns	of	British	progressives	about	how	to	respond	
to	myths	and	harsh	benefit	attitudes	are	misplaced.	It	is	true	that	many	benefit	myths	are	
widespread	in	Britain,	and	that	claimants	are	perceived	more	harshly	than	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago	
–	and	there	are	also	some	signs	that	these	myths	and	harsh	attitudes	are	linked.	However,	it	is	
doubtful	that	‘mythbusting’	will	have	large	impacts	on	either	of	them.	Moreover,	it	is	not	clear	that	
progressive	benefits	system	reforms	depend	on	wiping	out	either	myths	or	perceived	
undeservingness,	as	these	can	be	found	in	more	generous	benefit	systems	ranging	from	post-war	
Britain	to	present-day	Scandinavia.	At	the	population	level,	people	are	fundamentally	ambivalent	
about	benefits	systems,	and	what	is	critical	is	the	balance	between	the	positive	and	negative	aspects	
of	this	ambivalence.	This	is	a	different	starting	point	than	most	current	debates	on	benefits	in	
Britain,	but	one	that	is	borne	out	by	the	evidence,	and	takes	the	debates	in	a	different	direction.	
This	obviously	leaves	the	question	of	how	to	influence	this	balance	–	but	to	avoid	repeating	an	
argument	I	have	previously	made	in	this	journal,	I	will	only	summarise	this	briefly	here	(for	a	fuller	
argument,	see	Baumberg,	2012).	The	cornerstones	of	debates	about	benefits	are	often	set	by	the	
benefits	system	itself:	some	systems	‘open	up’	questions	of	deservingness,	while	others	close	them	
down	(Albrekt	Larsen,	2006).	This	still	leaves	some	space	to	‘reframe’	debates	to	support	progressive	
reforms	(Lakoff,	2014),	but	these	need	to	resonate	with	people’s	existing	beliefs,	which	are	in	turn	
partly	structured	by	the	present	system.	While	it	is	therefore	impossible	to	take	progressive	leaps	at	
first,	it	may	be	easier	to	take	a	series	of	small	steps	that	successively	unlock	the	possibility	of	
hitherto	impossible	changes.	This	is	something	that	Conservative	politicians	have	appreciated	(albeit	
with	opposing	aims),	setting	in	motion	reforms	in	the	1980s	that	change	public	preferences	and	
political	possibilities	in	the	2010s.	As	Margaret	Thatcher	once	said,	“it	isn't	that	I	set	out	on	economic	
policies…	Economics	are	the	method;	the	object	is	to	change	the	heart	and	soul”	(Thatcher,	1981).		
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